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South Sudan: Riek Machar’s Coup Failed, Nation’s Unity Preserved

By Joe Odaby

On the night of 15 December 2013, former South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar and his supporters attempted a military coup in Juba. The security forces quickly rallied in support of the acting President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his legitimate government and put down the coup after few brief clashes in the capital. By mid-day Juba was quiet and a shaken government was back operating.

The Fashoda Institute, a leading African think-tank, has published an in-depth analysis of the events leading to a failed coup. It unveils that Machar and his colleagues were relying on Nuer troops from Machar’s tribe against the national authorities and armed forces, while the government’s forces were comprised mainly of soldiers from all backgrounds.

“Hence, the coup was a milestone that cannot be ignored. After a decade-long concentrated effort (in the last phase of the war, during autonomy, and since independence) to bring together the country’s diverse population into an all-inclusive joint national effort to build the state and nation – Machar, a power-hungry leading politician, attempted to reverse the trend and base his lust for power on reawakening separatist demons”, concludes the analysis.

Fashoda Institute points out that during the War of Independence Machar’s predominantly Nuer forces fought on both sides – for and against the SPLA – at times directly fighting SPLA troops under Kiir’s command on behalf of Khartoum. The main reason for the frequent switching of sides has been the Nuer’s struggle for power against what Machar and his allies called “Dinka dominance.” The fight got very bitter.

For example, Machar’s Nuer troops were responsible for the 1991 brutal massacre in the ethnic Dinka town of Bor. After independence, President Kiir nominated Machar as his Vice-President in order to draw the Nuer – the country’s second largest tribe – into the nation building effort. However, Machar has manipulated the national reconciliation effort and any other political initiative possible in order to empower himself, his coterie and the Nuer (in this order) at the expense of the national interest. At the same time, Machar revived his lines of communication with the uppermost leadership in Khartoum in order, in the words of his loyalists in London, to keep “all his options open.” 

In June 2013 the Islamist government of Khartoum cut the oil pipeline delivering South Sudanese oil to the markets. This breach of all contracts and peace agreements was designed by Sudanese President al-Bashir  to strangulate the young, Christian democracy of South Sudan.

Machar, then the Vice President, was dispatched to Khartoum to negotiate the resumption of oil flow. Instead he started his private back door dealings with Khartoum. As his allies and confidants explained, “a renewed oil cutoff could bring South Sudan to its knees, triggering a wider governmental collapse” which Machar “can capitalize on to force [Kiir] out and then rise to power.”

This observation of Machar’s plans by his own allies and confidants shed a sinister and significant light on Machar’s own conduct of the negotiations in Khartoum.

“Little wonder that Machar was fired soon afterwards as part of South Sudan’s President Kiir’s revamping of the entire government. Now in opposition, Machar and his supporters, including Pagan Amum then Secretary-General of the ruling party – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – launched a series of drives to subvert the party’s institutions from within in order to topple President Kiir and declare Machar the SPLM’s uncontested candidate for presidency for the 2015 elections”, asserts the Fashoda Institute. “No matter how convoluted these efforts were  - they did not work. They did, however, compel President Kiir and his stalwarts to purge some of the SPLM’s elite in order to prevent chaos.”

“Cornered and nearly out of options, Machar reached out to his allies in Khartoum”, continues the analysis. “In early December, Machar sent emissaries to Khartoum in order to ask Hassan Al-Turabi, the Islamist luminary and leader of Sudan,s opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP), “to mediate the current political crisis” in South Sudan. Turabi was specifically asked by Machar’s emissaries and in Machar’s name “to intercede” with President Kiir in order to reverse the dismissal of “senior figures from the ruling SPLM and the government,” as well as subdue the “atmosphere of tensions” in Juba by permitting Mchar and his coterie to assume leading positions of power. Machar’s reaching out to Turabi – the main ideologue of Jihad – is not surprising given Machar’s long relations with Khartoum going back to the war of independence”.

Meanwhile, in early December, Juba was going through a political crisis in the SPLM as Amum kept manipulating procedures and planned events in order to empower Machar and his camp on the road to the 2015 elections. On 15 December, President Kiir harshly criticized Secretary-General Amum during a speech at a meeting of the SPLM’s council. The vast majority of the SPLM’s activists and rank and file strongly support the policies of President Kiir and his government.

“This was made clear by the reaction to Amum’s accusations and President Kiir’s response”, concludes the Fashoda Institute. “Hence, having realized that their efforts to subvert the SPLM from within in order to topple President Kiir and the majority support he enjoys came to naught – Machar and his coterie immediately launched the attempted coup in Juba. To the great fortune of the people of South Sudan, the sectarian coup has failed and the nation has preserved its unity”.

Sudan Prepares Major Military Offensive To Divert From Internal Unrest

By Joe Odaby

Juba, South Sudan — September 30, 2013 … The leading South Sudan think-tank, The Fashoda Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies, has published a strategic analysis of the recent military buildup in the neighboring Sudan.

Northern Sudan (capital: Khartoum), from which the South has seceded in 2011 after a long civil war, is led by the Islamist government of President Omar al-Bashar who was indicted in 2010 by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

The Fashoda institute points out that “the escalating fuel riots in Khartoum, and increasingly other cities in Sudan, serve as a stark reminder of the inherent fragility and instability of the country”.

The riots were sparked by the spiraling prices of all fuel products following the abolition of subsidies and the growing shortages of all fuel products. The recurring shortages of fuel result in shortages of food and other products and goods brought into Khartoum from both the Red Sea ports and the countryside. Within a few days, the riots became the worst since the 1989 riots that led to the military coup that brought to power Omar al-Bashir. “What began early this week in Sudan as a protest against the removal of fuel subsidies has developed into a full-blown uprising that is threatening President Omar Hassan al-Bashir’s 24-year rule,” Arab political observers warned on September 27.

As the Khartoum riots escalated and turned political, the Sudanese military was sent to the streets to crackdown the riots by force. By 27 September, the Sudanese government acknowledged that over 50 demonstrators were killed by the security forces, over 250 were wounded, and over 600 were arrested. Numerous opposition sources put the casualties tally in Khartoum alone at over 150 fatalities, over 750 wounded, and over 2,000 arrested and/or disappeared. The military’s violent crackdown in Khartoum sparked even bigger and more violent riots over the weekend throughout Sudan. The protesters are now openly demanding the overthrow of Bashir’s regime while calling Bashir himself “a killer”. Moreover, both the Sudanese government and Arab diplomats report a growing use of automatic weapons by the rioters starting the evening of September 27. On the morning of the September 28, four security personnel were shot and killed in Khartoum by unidentified gunmen in the ranks of the rioters.

The Fashoda Institute writes that “the oil crisis is unfolding and escalating at a time when Khartoum is spending huge sums of hard currency on advanced weapons – mainly weapon systems optimized for long-range strikes and major wars rather than handling insurgencies such as the never-ending insurgency in Darfur”.

The Juba-based think-tank unveils that “in recent months, Khartoum has embarked on an unprecedented military build-up – mainly of air power. The key weapon systems are being purchased from Belarus. Most important is the acquisition of 12 refurbished Su-24Ms (4-6 of them already supplied) and 18 refurbished Su-30MKs (originally leased by India from Russia but returned to Belarus for the legal reason that the Russian Air Force cannot operate them).

Sudan was also negotiating the acquisition of another batch of second hand Su-25s to augment the existing fleet of 11 Su-25s (out of 14 originally purchased from Belarus). Belarus has a large arsenal of high quality combat aircraft that was put on sale for hard currency. A total of 35-36 Su-24Ms were withdrawn from service in February 2012, and the remaining 22-23 Su-24Ms are available for purchase. As well, 17 Su-27P and 4 Su-27UBM1fighters were withdrawn from service in December 2012 and also put for sale. The Belarus Air Force also has around 20 Su-25s stored in Lida. Khartoum expressed interest in virtually every major combat aircraft available and the main lingering issue is the availability of hard currency”. 

The Fashoda Institute points at the scope of the Sudanese military buildup: “Sudan is also looking for additional MiG-29s which Belarus cannot offer. Sudan acquired numerous MiG-29s in the last decade. In late 2008, 23 of the MiG-29s were in active service. However, only 11 of these MiG-29s were operational in the first half of 2013. One MiG-29 was claimed by the South Sudanese air defense on April 4, 2012. Apparently, the aircraft crash-landed in a Sudanese airbase and was written off. The other 11 MiG-29s were grounded due to maintenance difficulties. Sudan is interested in a large number of MiG-29s and the main candidate source is Ukraine that has around 100 MiG-29s of various models stored in reserve”.

“The most important undertaking by the Sudanese Air Force in recent months is the large scale recruitment of mercenaries – aircrews, technical experts and ground crews – from all over the former Soviet Union”, discovers the Fashoda Institute. “Their main mission is to activate, up-grade and better utilize the existing arsenal of the Sudanese Air Force (that had suffered both combat and technical damage in recent years). The first visible result is the growing number of MiG-29s that are taking off for test and evaluation flights. The efforts of the ex-Soviet mercenaries have already returned 4-6 additional MiG-29s to flying status.

The revamped Sudanese Air Force has unprecedented long range reach covering northern Ethiopia and all of nemesis South Sudan. Indeed, the Sudanese government is also committing huge resources to the up-grading and expansion of all key military airbases in the southern parts of the country – including the extension of paved runways and the construction of new buildings, bunkers and other facilities.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese government is making strenuous efforts with Russia to expedite and increase the deal for assault helicopters and helicopter gunships. On order are 12+6 Mi-8T and 12+6 Mi-24D/V/P. Although Khartoum is ready to pay cash for everything – the Kremlin is not rushing the deal for political-strategic reasons. Again, the Sudanese acquisition of weapon systems is accompanied by the widespread recruitment of mercenaries – aircrews, technical experts and ground crews – to get Sudan’s existing arsenal of 20 Mi-8/Mi-17 assault and 24 Mi-24 combat helicopters into better operational status, and have highly qualified aircrews in the cockpits”.

The Fashoda Institute points out that “although the main emphasis of Khartoum is air power, the expansion and modernization of the military is not neglected either. The current priority of Khartoum is launching a concentrated effort to fully operationalize and activate the large quantities of heavy weapons (tanks and artillery) purchased from Ukraine in 2009-2010 and delivered over the next couple of years. The main weapon systems are T-72 MBTs, BM-21 MRLs, 152mm 1S3 SPGs, 122mm 2S1 SPGs, and 122mm D-30 guns. As well, the Sudanese army has embarked on the refurbishment and modernization of key military bases and garrisons in southern Sudan – including the installation of modern communications systems.

The Sudanese military build-up effort got a major boost on 9 September during the visit of Libyan defense minister Abdel-Rahman Al-Thani to Khartoum. Sudan’s defense minister Abdel Rahim Hussein signed an agreement with his Libyan counterpart on large scale weapons, spares and ammunition transfers mainly from Qadhafi’s stockpiles in southern Libya. In return, Sudan promised to restrain Libyan Jihadists that had sought and received shelter in Sudan and prevent them from returning to Libya. (The Sudan-Libya agreement is identical to the agreement signed with Egypt in 2001.) The supplies from Libya will also enable the Sudanese military to activate and return to operational use a sizeable force of older models of Soviet-origin weapons”.

“Taken together, these efforts point out to active preparations for a major land war rather than mere escalation of the fighting against irregular forces in Darfur or elsewhere in Sudan”, highlights the report of the Fashoda Institute.

“Khartoum needs a major diversion of the popular anguish and frustration”, says the Institute’s analysis. “Addressing external threats is a proven diversion from internal crises. The calls for the reunification of Sudan under the banner of Islam have been a popular rallying cry for the widespread Islamist and Mahdist constituencies – and thus a sure method for getting their supporters out of the swelling ranks of rioters. Moreover, it is also expedient for the Bashir administration to blame the oil crisis and shortage of funds on the lingering impact of the transfer of so many oilfields to South Sudan after the mid-2011 break-up of Sudan.           

Ultimately, Khartoum is driven by the grim realities of the region, and Bashir’s determination to get involved in crises with assertive offensive strategy. Irrespective of reassuring political rhetoric – Sudan and South Sudan are heading toward a major face-off that might easily escalate into violence. Abyei remains a volatile region with tension growing as a result of Sudan’s atrocious suppression of grassroots revolts in surrounding South Kordofan. The Abyei crisis will also keep lingering since the referendum is nowhere to be seen. Khartoum considers the Abyei oil reserves a shortcut to addressing the economic catastrophe and therefore won’t accept the secession the local population yearns for. The road to war from such irreconcilable quandary is very short. Abyei is not the only crisis point for the South Sudan-Sudan border demarcation as proposed by the AU is equally problematic and destabilizing, and thus might provoke crisis and war at any moment.

Furthermore, even though Cairo is currently focused on domestic issues in the aftermath of the military takeover – the crisis with Ethiopia over the Nile waters lingers on and is far from resolution. Dominance over the Nile waters is a sacred cause for both Egypt and Sudan – and thus no government in Cairo or Khartoum will ever allow itself to be portrayed as having compromised with the Nile Basin states. With no viable solution in sight, and with the work on the Ethiopian dams continuing apace – the crisis might still escalate into a major war. South Sudan will be dragged into such a war by regional geography”.  

“Thus, all of these are both ticking crises in their own right, as well as good causes for diversion and tension building for the besieged Bashir administration”, warns the Fashoda Institute. “Hence, Khartoum’s saber rattling and war preparations might prove self-fulfilling”.

The report on the think-tanks Website ends with assessment of the Juba’s options: “Little wonder that South Sudan is considering its own military build-up – as declared on September 22 by the new Defense Minister Kuol Manyang. Juba is determined to build a strong national army even if such undertaking might take nearly half of the national budget allocation. Manyang explained that Juba wants “the army to be at full military readiness to ensure victories in any military engagements.” Juba’s “strategic vision” calls for the building of “a strong and professional force” in regional terms. Manyang stressed that Juba’s ultimate objective is to deter the eruption of wars and crises, but that “the army, anywhere in the world, can only avoid wars when it is capable of winning them.”

South Sudan Breaks Oil Embargo Imposed By Muslim North

By Joe Odaby

Juba — September 5, 2013 (SSN). The visit by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir to Sudan’s capitol Khartoum on September 3-4, 2013, might prove a turning point in both bilateral and regional terms. In the climax of the Summit, Presidents Kiir and Omar al-Bashir signed oil export agreement guaranteeing the South Sudanese oil exports will continue “without any impediments” across “flexible but secure borders” between the two countries.

The agreement removes the immediate threat of economic strangulation and uncertainty by repeated Sudanese threats to close down the oil exports of South Sudan via the pipeline to Port Sudan.

Kiir and Bashir also agreed to “remove all obstacles” in bilateral relations and fully implement all existing cooperation agreements. In this context, the two presidents tilted toward the Juba interpretation of these mutual agreements – namely, the separation between economic issues and each of the various security issues from border delineation to the fate of Abye (where the referendum scheduled for October is unlikely to be implemented on time). Khartoum remained reticent, though.

“We are now taking new steps,” Bashir told Kiir. “We respect all the agreements … and are committed to implementing them as one package.” Kiir was more optimistic about the impact of the Summit. Khartoum and Juba must “close the old chapters and open a new page,” he said. “These two countries cannot always remain on a war footing. If they do that, they cannot offer services to their citizens.” Kiir considered the Khartoum Summit to be the springboard for a new era in bilateral relations. “I do not want these agreements to be on the books [only]; we will work to implement them fully and we are here for that,” Kiir noted.

This breakthrough did not happen in a vacuum. In early August, soon after the establishment of the new government, President Kiir instructed the government to come up with a breakout in the deadlocked relationship between South Sudan and Sudan. Within days, Foreign Minister Dr Barnaba Marial Benjamin announced the formulation of new Sudan policy in effort to address the immediate economic challenges and defuse mounting threats along their mutual border and elsewhere.

After rocky start and several delays in the planned Kiir-Bashir Summit, Juba succeeded to convince Khartoum of its sincerity and the Summit took place. Indeed, President Kiir arrived in Khartoum a mere 72 hours ahead of the expiration of the deadline set by Khartoum to halt the flow of South Sudanese oil via the pipeline to Port Sudan.

Beyond the dramatic oil export agreement, the Summit contributes to the overall building of trust and reducing tension between the two neighboring countries.

Ultimately, however, the greatest achievement of President Kiir in the Khartoum Summit is buying time and securing funds for consolidating the true independence of South Sudan from strategic and economic points of view. The arrested development of the first two years – the direct result of the country’s stifling by blocking of oil exports – can now end and the true potential of South Sudan be realized.

Juba will soon have the resources to properly address the growing geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of South Sudan in both economic and regional strategic spheres. Juba can free land locked South Sudan from dependence on one venue of export, as well as develop a system of regional alliances and joint infrastructure construction programs (particularly westward as favored by the EU and Russia).

Juba can also accomplish a long-overdue defense build-up to address the lingering domestic crises (particularly Jonglei), the growing regional instability (such as still unresolved Nile waters crisis), and the unprecedented build-up by the Sudanese Armed Forces (especially the Air Force).

With Juba’s new political vitality and acumen clearly demonstrated in the conduct during the Khartoum Summit – Western political leaders and senior experts are eagerly awaiting the follow-up moves at the geo-strategic and geo-economic levels.

South Sudan: Environmental, Social Management Framework Released

By Joe Odaby
South Sudan News

 Juba, South Sudan — August 28, 2013 (SSN) … The World Bank and bilateral donors are supporting efforts by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to deliver services to the population through supporting the development of the Local Government Service Delivery Project (LGSD).

LGSD aims at supporting improvements in local governance and deliver services to communities through strengthening of community engagement and local government capacities in planning, implementation and oversight of local development activities.

The final Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) document  for South Sudan is available on-line and can be read here.

This is part of the efforts of the newly appointed South Sudanese Government to advance broad reforms in all spheres of national life. On July 23, South Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit issued a presidential decree removing Vice-President Riek Machar Teny and dissolving the whole government of South Sudan.

Kiir dismissed all 29 ministers and deputy ministers. The decree directed the under-secretaries of the various ministries to run South Sudan’s ministries until further notice. The decree also stipulated the new government will have only 18 national ministers and deputy ministers in order to streamline government work. A senior official at the presidency predicted that government ministers will be replaced in a “very short time, as soon as possible.”

Fashoda Institute, the leading, Juba-based think-tank, asserts that “in embarking on the profound reshuffle of government, President Kiir put the national interest ahead of internal politics and the early posturing for the 2015 presidential elections”.

South Sudan is facing numerous emergencies and challenges as a result of the attempt at economic stifling by Sudan. The economic development of South Sudan has been arrested by the Sudanese blocking of oil exports – thus depriving South Sudan of its primary source of revenues.

The Fashoda Institute states that Sudan has been sponsoring – primarily through the supply of weapons, ammunition and funds – the sustenance and escalation of insurgencies and tribal violence throughout South Sudan to the detriment of internal development. Allegations of endemic corruption throughout the entire government – which already led Kiir to undertake drastic measures such as suspending two senior ministers – considerably restricted the availability of foreign aid.

“The ability of the Kiir Government to tackle these daunting challenges has been needlessly complicated by their cynical exploitation by Vice-President Machar”, reports the Fashoda Institute.

“President Kiir will have a new and invigorated government that will be able to finally tackle the key challenges facing South Sudan: building alternate oil export venues – both short-term and long-term regional infrastructure; enhancing security and suppressing violence both internally and along the borders with Sudan and the Central African Republic; and launching overdue major social and economic development to put the country on a long-term ascent track. Juba will thus demonstrate activism – that is, initiate and launch major programs rather than be beholden to foreign aid.

The Fashoda political analysts write that “President Kiir is correct in arguing that it was impossible to initiate anything beforehand because of the endemic lack of funds and government crises. Soon, with a new government in office and limited income from the short-term export push coming in – President Kiir’s Juba will be moving fast and resolutely to alleviate crises the moment this becomes possible”.

South Sudan Devastated By Floods, Requests Emergency Humanitarian Aid

sudan_floods

By John Leaman
South Sudan News

Juba — August 24, 2013  (SSN) … More than 18,000 people with over 1,000 households in South Sudan have been affected and others displaced from their homes by devastating floods that ravaged the Maiwut County in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State in recent days.

According to County authorities people are deeply suffering and lacking basic essentials. Women and children have mostly been displaced due to flooded homes.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the medical NGO, says about 90,000 people are still missing.

Over 48 people have been killed with severe damage to public buildings, including schools, clinics, offices, shops, markets and water and sanitation facilities. Roads in South Sudan have been inundated, disrupting transport.

south_sudan_flooded_homes_and_crops

Many are still taking shelter at higher grounds and others remain in the open without any food or shelter and no proper medication as water born diseases increases with prevalence of increasing malaria cases where three have already lost their lives.

South Sudan’s Government is stepping in to provide emergency assistance to the flooded areas but the resources of the country are limited due to the economic Jihad waged against this new democratic state by its Islamist northern neighbor, Sudan.

South Sudan’s Government is calling on Humanitarian Organizations to step in and provide assistance immediately to avoid an escalation of malnutrition and diseases.

The floods have been the worst one in two decades and people fear more rains from across the neighboring Ethiopian highlands.

UN agencies led by OCHA and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNIMSS) have already conducted a brief assessment mission in the area and explained that immediate assistance such as food, cover sheets and medicines and will be provided to the displaced people. 

Iran, Sudan Surge To West Africa

iran_port_sudan

By Juliet Abango
South Sudan News

JUBA — 1 July, 2013 … The Washington-based think-tank The International Strategic Studies Association has devoted the latest issue of Global Information System (GIS) Special Analysis, a confidential newsletter used by the Western governments and select subscribers, to the latest Sudanese-Iranian designs for the entire west Africa.

“The governments of Iran and Sudan are preparing for a major strategic surge into western Africa, into both the Sahel and the shores of the Gulf of Guinea,” the report warns.

“The ultimate objective of this surge is to consolidate control and/or influence over this extensive region and its considerable oil, gas, uranium, and other minerals (rare metals and rare earth) reserves. At the same time, the surge would pre-empt and prevent both the US/West/NATO presence and the spread of anti-Shi’ite takfiri-jihadist entities.”

The GIS Special Analysis not only raises the alarm about Sudan’s threat to international security but reiterates anew the unique strategic significance of the Republic of South Sudan for the vital interests of the industrialized world, as analyzed in the studies of the Fashoda Institute.

The GIS study, echoing the opinion of the Fashoda Institute, points out that the real reason for President Bashir’s recent stopping of the oil exports of South Sudan has nothing to do with the official line of alleged support for the SPLM-N in its fight against Sudanese genocidal suppression.

In Spring 2013, Iran began to markedly expand its strategic facilities in Sudan in order to facilitate the surge westward across western Africa all the way to the coasts of the Atlantic. “In May 2013, the pace and scope of the construction of the Iranian naval, military and logistical bases in Port Sudan grew markedly. IRGC engineering units in civilian clothes and a vast army of Sudanese workers build both logistical piers to rapidly download and upload vessels, and military piers to support warships and submarines.

Further away from the port, the Iranians and the Sudanese are building several new clusters of fortified bunkers and other storage sites. Both the new piers and the fortified storage sites would be able to handle tanks and combat vehicles, missile systems, self-propelled artillery and other heavy weaponry. In mid-May 2013, the IRGC units started the construction of fencing, watchtowers, and fortifications, as well as the construction of fortified air-defense positions where SAM batteries would be deployed.”

“By now,” the GIS study explains, “the extent of the Iranian-Sudanese activities is difficult to conceal. Khartoum and Tehran increasingly worry that Israel, the US, or other Western powers, are closely monitoring progress and even might attempt to sabotage the new port facilities.

Iranian security experts warned that their new facilities were virtually adjacent to Port Sudan’s oil exporting installations.” This realization of the proximity of the Port Sudan oil port to the Iranian naval base is the real reason for Khartoum’s decision to stop the oil exports from South Sudan. “In mid-May 2013,” the GIS study continues, “South Sudan was to start exporting its oil through the oil loading facilities in Port Sudan.

Tehran worries that when oil customers of South Sudan – the staunch friend of the West and Israel – arrive with tankers they will be in excellent position to spy on, and even strike, the Iranian sprawling military facilities in Port Sudan.” Therefore, Bashir suddenly announced on June 8 the halting of the export of South Sudanese oil via Sudan’s pipeline. The fact that this stoppage is in violation of the agreements between Juba and Khartoum does not matter for Bashir’s higher priorities – protecting the Iranian build-up in Port Sudan – dominate Khartoum’s decision. Thus, on June 21, Bashir reiterated that until South Sudan implemented “all agreements by 100 percent, no barrel of oil will be piped to Port Sudan”.

The next major phase in the Sudanese preparations for the surge took place in the second half of June with the joining of the Central African Republic (CAR) as a crucial ally. The turning point came in the aftermath of the June 17 visit of CAR President Michel Djotodia to Khartoum where he and Bashir oversaw a series of secret multi-national discussions aimed to facilitate a dramatic break-out westward for Sudan, Iran, the CAR and their allies. Djotodia is not only the first Muslim leader of the predominantly Christian CAR, but he was converted to Islamism-Jihadism while serving as a councilor in Darfur.

“He is convinced in the Sudanese tenet that a strong jihadist kernel is indispensable to ensuring the loyalty and cohesion of any revolutionary movement irrespective of its openly declared ideology or policy,” the GIS study explains. “Djotodia is convinced he is beholden to Bashir’s Sudan for his own ascent to power and soon after assuming power in Bangui started sending quantities of CAR diamonds to his friends in the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militias in Darfur to help fund their genocidal struggle.”

One of the major topics discussed between Bashir and Djotodia is the new role for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader Joseph Kony (who is in Sudan, receiving supplies and shelter in return for military cooperation in both the CAR and Uganda). “Sudan’s ultimate objective is to use LRA forces based in the CAR in order to destabilize the Republic of South Sudan, and then use its territory to have LRA forces reach and destabilize Uganda. Kony has already committed to pursuing Sudan’s strategy,” the GIS study reveals. “The CAR is thus becoming a hub of subversion in the heart of the Africa with geopolitical ramifications extending far beyond the borders and capabilities of the CAR itself.”  

The most important outcome of Djotodia’s visit is the groundbreaking regional security agreement reached in a session co-chaired by the two presidents. Delegations of senior intelligence and security forces officials from Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Mali, and Mauritania took part in the meeting. They “discussed and agreed on close strategic cooperation to restore Arab-Muslim preeminence to the entire region of West Africa” and “committed to the consolidation of mutually loyal and supportive regimes, as well as to assisting other regional countries to establish Muslim-dominated governments and to have them join their alliance.

The senior officials discussed practical modalities for jointly breaking-away from stifling Western influence and demands for reforms. They agreed on cooperation in resolving security and economic crises and suppressing democratic opposition forces.”

The GIS study adds that “all countries present also committed to helping Egypt and Sudan in their ‘sacred struggle’ to sustain the Arab rights to and dominance over the Nile waters. Thus, the June 17, 2013, agreement constituted a major and strategically profound shift in the regional posture and assertiveness. If implemented, West Africa will not be the same,” states The International Strategic Studies Association.

The East-West surge – at which eastern edge South Sudan is – has become even more important for the vital interests of the industrialized world. This is a surge of radical Islam, Jihadism and organized crime that seeks to destroy the post-colonial state system and replace it with an amorphous radicalized area that will serve as springboard into Western Europe.
This surge originates in Sudan and has already reached the shores of the Atlantic in Mauritania.

It is imperative for African states to face, address and resolve this great challenge to west Africa. Because Nigeria, for long a bulwark of regional stability, is mired in rapidly escalating fratricidal violence – South Sudan in the east and Morocco in the west remain the only two viable pillars of stability and Western interests in the tumultuous region that west Africa has become.”

South Sudan, bordering both Sudan and the Central African Republic, is thus of unique crucial importance for the grand strategic interests of the industrialized world. Moreover, South Sudan is already paying heavy price for protecting the vital interests of the West. Sudan is blocking the oil exports crucial for the economic recovery of South Sudan and is sponsoring and encouraging subversion and insurrection at the heart of South Sudan to increase instability and harm nation building.

Already a victim of this Iranian-Sudanese surge, South Sudan – the country the GIS correctly calls “the staunch friend of the West and Israel” – will soldier on as the West’s bastion of stability as is expected of staunch allies.